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1
1 Introduction
The theory of imperfect competition is dominated by two approaches that seem to clash with each other.
Whereas industrial organization stresses the importance of strategic interactions among ﬁrms, the model of
imperfect competition used in economic ﬁelds such as trade, economic geography and growth is the CES model of
monopolistic competition developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In this model, any form of interaction among
ﬁrms is absent. In addition, in oligopolistic markets, price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) competition
deliver market solutions that typically diﬀer, making it hard to formulate robust predictions. The purpose of
this paper is to contribute to this debate by providing a comparison of these three types of competition. This
is accomplished in an economy involving one sector and a population of consumers endowed with separable
preferences and a ﬁnite number of labor units. Although we recognize that additive preferences are restrictive,
they are widely used in the literature and suﬃce to shed new light on old questions. Note also that the budget
constraint implies that ﬁrms do not behave like monopolists.
According to the “Folk Theorem of Competitive Markets,” perfect competition almost holds when ﬁrms
are small relative to the size of the market. In the same spirit, there has been a vivid debate in the 1930s
between, on the one side, Chamberlin (1933) and, on the other, Robinson (1934) and Kaldor (1935) about the
relevance of monopolistic competition as a possible market structure. Robinson and Kaldor maintained against
Chamberlin that perfect competition must emerge when the number of ﬁrms becomes arbitrarily large relative
to market size. No clear answer came out of this debate because these authors lacked the analytical tools to
study the convergence issue. Our paper shows that the answer depends on the nature of preferences.
It was not until 1980 that Novshek was able to tackle the convergence issue rigorously for Cournot games
in which ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good and face U-shaped average costs. In the spirit of methods used in
general equilibrium theory, Novshek (1980) chose to make ﬁrms small relative to the market by replicating the
demand side. When the number of replications is suﬃciently large, the equilibrium is nearly competitive. As for
Bertrand diﬀerentiated oligopoly, Novshek and Chowdhury (2003) showed that the convergence of the Bertrand
equilibria toward the perfectly competitive equilibrium may not take place, even under strong assumptions on
technologies.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. We ﬁrst show that a Cournot diﬀerentiated oligopoly generates a higher
markup than a Bertrand diﬀerentiated oligopoly when the number of ﬁrms is exogenously given. This is
in accordance with the folk wisdom of industrial organization according to which Cournot competition is
softer than Bertrand competition. Second, as the number of competitors becomes arbitrarily large, both
types of competition deliver the same equilibrium outcome. Whether the limit of Cournot and Bertrand
competition is perfectly competitive or monopolistically competitive depends on consumers’ attitude toward
product diﬀerentiation. Using the concept of relative love for variety, which measures the intensity of the
preference for variety, we show that each ﬁrm operating in a large economy retains enough market power to
enjoy a positive markup when the relative love for variety remains bounded away from zero at arbitrarily low
consumption levels. On the contrary, when the relative love for variety vanishes at zero, consumers cease to value
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product diﬀerentiation. A growing number of ﬁrms thus leads to the perfectly competitive outcome. In sum,
the market structure that emerges as the limit of oligopolistic competition depends on the nature of preferences.
Last, when ﬁrms are free to enter the market, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms are more aggressive than
oligopolistic ﬁrms in that these ﬁrms charge lower prices, while the mass of varieties provided by the market is
smaller $$under oligopolistic competition than under monopolistic competition.$$ If the economy is suﬃciently
large, Cournot, Bertrand and Chamberlin solutions converge toward the same market outcome, which need not
be a competitive equilibrium.
2 The model
2.1 Firms and consumers
There is one sector supplying a horizontally diﬀerentiated good and one production factor - labor - and a mass
L of identical consumers. Each consumer supplies one unit of labor and owns 1/L of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The labor
market is perfectly competitive and labor is chosen as the numéraire. The diﬀerentiated good is made available
under the form of a ﬁnite number n ≥ 2 of varieties. Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm and each ﬁrm
produces a single variety. To operate every ﬁrm needs a ﬁxed requirement f ≥ 0 and a marginal requirement
c > 0 of labor. Since wage is normalized to 1, the cost of producing qi units of variety i = 1, ..., n is equal to
f + cqi.
Consumers share the same additive preferences given by
U(x) =
n
i=1
u(xi), (1)
where u is thrice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R+. The strict
concavity of u implies that consumers have a love for variety: when a consumer is allowed to consume X
units of the diﬀerentiated good, she strictly prefers the consumption proﬁle xi = X/n to any other proﬁle
x = (x1, ..., xn) such that

i xi = X.
Following Zhelobodko et al. (2012), we deﬁne the relative love for variety (RLV) as follows:
ru(x) ≡ −
xu′′(x)
u′(x)
,
which is strictly positive for all x > 0. Very much like the Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk-aversion, the RLV is a
local measure of consumers’ variety-seeking behavior. A higher value of the RLV means a stronger love for
variety. On the contrary, ru(x) = 0 means that the consumer perceives the varieties as perfect substitutes.
Under the CES, we have u(x) = xρ where ρ is a constant such that 0 < ρ ≤ 1, thus implying a constant
RLV given by 1− ρ. Other examples include: (i) the CARA utility u(x) = 1 − exp(−αx) where α > 0 is the
absolute love for variety (Behrens and Murata, 2007), while the RLV is increasing and given by αx; and (ii)
the quadratic utility u(x) = αx− βx2/2, with α, β > 0; the RLV is increasing and given by βx/(α− βx).
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The budget constraint is given by
n
i=1
pixi = y. (2)
A consumer’s income y is equal to her wage plus her share of total proﬁts:
y = 1+
1
L
n
i=1
Πi ≥ 1,
where the proﬁts earned by ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = (pi − c)qi − f, (3)
pi being the price of variety i.
The ﬁrst-order condition for utility maximization yields
u′(xi) = λpi,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier deﬁned by
λ(x, y) =
n
j=1 xju
′(xj)
y
≥ 0. (4)
A consumer’s inverse demand for variety i is such that
pi(xi,x−i, y) =
u′(xi)
λ
, (5)
where x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ...xn).
2.2 Market equilibrium
The market equilibrium is deﬁned by the following conditions.
(E.1) Each consumer maximizes her utility (1) subject to (2).
(E.2) Each ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt (3) with respect to qi (Cournot) or pi (Bertrand).
(E.3) Product market clears:
Lxi = qi for i = 1, ..., n.
(E.4) Labor market clears:
nf + c
n
i=1
qi = L.
The last condition implies that
q¯ ≡ 1
c

L
n
− f

⇐⇒ x¯ ≡ 1
c

1
n
− f
L

(6)
are the only candidate symmetric equilibrium output and consumption, which both decrease with n. As a
consequence, Cournot competition and Bertrand competition are equally eﬃcient when the number of ﬁrms
4
is the same, which contradicts Vives (1985). The reason for this diﬀerence in results lies in the wide-spread
assumption made in standard oligopoly models: the labor (or input) supply is perfectly elastic. In contrast,
labor supply is perfectly inelastic in our setup. Between these two extreme cases, there is a continuum of
possibilities. To be speciﬁc, a labor supply with a positive and ﬁnite elasticity implies that things work as if a
ﬁrm’s marginal cost $$γ(q)$$ were increasing. In this case, the equilibrium consumption and output $$are the
same under Bertrand and Cournot and given by$$
Lx∗ = q∗ ≡ β−1

L
n
− f

,
where β(q) ≡ qγ(q) is strictly increasing from 0 to ∞. Note also than nf is the minimum labor requirement
for n ﬁrms to operate. Therefore, n cannot exceed L/f , which implies x¯ ≥ 0.
2.2.1 Cournot
Using (4) and (5), we obtain ﬁrm i’s inverse demand:
pi(x) =
yCu′(xi)n
j=1 xju
′(xj)
, (7)
where yC is a consumer’s income under Cournot competition. Firm i’s proﬁt function is then given by
ΠCi (x) = [pi(xi,x−i)− c]Lxi − f =

yCu′(xi)n
j=1 xju
′(xj)
− c

Lxi − f. (8)
For any given n ≥ 2, a Cournot equilibrium is a vector x∗=(x∗1, . . . , x∗n) such that each strategy x∗i is ﬁrm
i’s best reply to the strategies x∗−i chosen by the other ﬁrms. This equilibrium is symmetric if x
∗
i = x
C for all
i = 1, ..., n.
2.2.2 Bertrand
Assume now that ﬁrms compete in prices. Let p = (p1, ..., pn) be a price vector. In this case, consumers’
demand functions xi(p) are obtained by solving the system of equations (7) with i = 1, ..., n, where yC is
replaced with yB that is, a consumer’s income under Bertrand competition. A consumer’s demand for variety
i is then
xi(p) = ξ(piλ(pi,p−i)), (9)
where ξ(·) is the inverse function of u′(·). Thus, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by
ΠBi (p) = (pi − c)qi(p)− f = (pi − c)Lξ(piλ(pi,p−i))− f. (10)
It follows from (4) and (9) that λ can be rewritten as a function of p. Indeed, the budget constraint
n
j=1
pjxj(p) = y
B
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implies that
λ(p) =
1
yB
n
j=1
xj(p)uj (x(p)) ,
where the income yB is given by
yB = 1+
1
L
n
j=1
ΠBi (p).
A Nash equilibrium p∗ = (p∗1, ..., p
∗
n) of this game is called a Bertrand equilibrium. This equilibrium is
symmetric if p∗i = p
B for all i.
3 Comparing Cournot and Bertrand
One major diﬃculty in general equilibrium with oligopolistic ﬁrms is the income eﬀect. Ever since Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972), it is well known that ﬁrms operating in an imperfectly competitive environment are able to
manipulate individual incomes through the proﬁts they redistribute to consumers. By changing consumers’
incomes, ﬁrms aﬀect their demand functions, whence their proﬁts. Accounting for such feedback eﬀects typi-
cally leads to the nonexistence of an equilibrium because the resulting proﬁt functions are not quasi-concave
(Roberts and Sonnenschein, 1977). This negative result probably explains why many economic models involv-
ing imperfectly competitive product markets rely on the CES model of monopolistic competition, where the
existence of an equilibrium $$is easy to show because ﬁrms are non-strategic.$$ In this paper, we assume that
ﬁrms recognize that income is endogenous because they operate in a general equilibrium environment. How-
ever, ﬁrms treat income parametrically, which means that they behave like “income-takers.” This approach is
in the spirit of Hart (1985) for whom ﬁrms may take into account only some eﬀects of their policy on the whole
economy.1 Even though our model does not capture all possible strategic aspects, it is a full-ﬂedged general
equilibrium model in which oligopolistic ﬁrms account for strategic interactions within their group, as well as
for endogenous incomes through the distribution of proﬁts.
A consumer’s income
y = 1+
1
L
n
j=1
[(pj − c)qj − f ] = 1− nf/L+
n
j=1
(pj − c)xj
depends on x under Cournot and p under Bertrand. Firms are said to be income-takers when they are aware
that the income is endogenous, but treat y parametrically:
∂y
∂xi
= 0

∂y
∂pi
= 0

for all i. (11)
1When product markets are imperfectly competitive, it is common to assume that ﬁrms do not manipulate wages, even though
ﬁrms also have market power on the labor market. d’Aspremont et al. (1996) is a noticeable exception.
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3.1 Cournot
Firm i’s proﬁts may be expressed as follows:
ΠCi =

yCu′(xi)n
j=1xju
′(xj)
− c

Lxi − f.
Using (11), the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization yields
yCu′(xi)n
j=1xju
′(xj)
− c+
u′′(xi)
n
j=1xju
′(xj)− u′(xi) [u′(xi) + xiu′′i (xi)]n
j=1xju
′(xj)
2 xiyC = 0.
Given (7), this expression is equivalent to
mCi ≡
pi − c
pi
=
xi
u′(xi)
u′(xi) [u
′(xi) + xiu
′′
i (xi)]− u′′(xi)
n
j=1xju
′(xj)n
j=1xju
′(xj)
.
Along the diagonal, the candidate equilibrium markup mC is equal to
mC = ru
	
xC


+
xCu′(xC)
	
1− ru(xC)


nxCu′(xC)
=
1
n
+
n− 1
n
ru
	
xC


, (12)
where xC = x¯. Note that ru
	
xC


must be smaller than 1 for mC < 1 to be satisﬁed. Since xC can take on any
positive value, for an equilibrium to exist under any collection of the parameter values, it must be that
ru(x) < 1 for all x ≥ 0. (13)
It is well known that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is strictly quasi-concave if the second-order condition for
proﬁt-maximization is satisﬁed at any solution to the ﬁrst-order condition. We show in Appendix A that the
second-order condition always holds if
ru′(x) = −
xu′′′(x)
u′′(x)
< 2. (14)
This condition highlights the need to impose restrictions on the third derivative of the utility u to prove the
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. $$The HARA functions satisfy both (13) and (14) conditions,
but the CARA does not because ru(x) = ru′(x) = αx. However, our results remain valid when the number of
ﬁrms is suﬃciently large for x¯ ∈ (0, α−1) to hold (see (6)).$$
To sum up, if (13) and (14) hold, then (12) is the unique symmetric equilibrium markup of the Cournot
game.
3.2 Bertrand
Applying the ﬁrst-order condition to (10) yields the markup
mBi ≡
pi − c
pi
= − ξ(piλ)
ξ′(piλ)pi

λ+ pi
∂λ
∂pi
 , (15)
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which involves ∂λ/∂pi because λ depends on p. Diﬀerentiating both sides of the budget constraint
n
j=1
pjξ(pjλ(p)) = y
B (16)
with respect to pi when y
B is treated parametrically, we get
ξ(piλ(p)) + piξ
′(piλ(p))λ+
n
j=1
p2jξ
′(pjλ(p))
∂λ
∂pi
= 0,
or, equivalently,
∂λ
∂pi
= −ξ(piλ(p)) + piλ(p)ξ
′(piλ(p))n
j=1 p
2
jξ
′(pjλ(p))
. (17)
Substituting (17) into (15) and symmetrizing leads the candidate equilibrium markup:
mB = − ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
	
1− 1
n
+ ru(ξ(λp))

 = n
n− 1 + ru (xB)
ru
	
xB


< 1, (18)
where we have used the identity
ru(x) ≡ −
ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
,
along the diagonal. As in the Cournot case, xB is equal to x¯.
We show in Appendix B that the second-order condition is satisﬁed if (13) and (14) hold. Under these
circumstances, (18) is the unique symmetric markup of the Bertrand game.
Using (6) and comparing (12) and (18), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that a symmetric equilibrium exists under Cournot and Bertrand competition when
the number of ﬁrms is equal to n < L/f . If ﬁrms are income-takers, the equilibrium markups are given by
mC(n) =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
ru

1
cn
− f
cL

mB(n) =
n
n− 1 + ru

1
cn − fcL
ru 1
cn
− f
cL

,
while
mC(n) > mB(n).
The following remarks are in order. First, when the number of ﬁrms is given and the same, Cournot com-
petition always generates a higher markup than Bertrand competition. This reﬂects the folk wisdom according
to which Cournot competition is “softer” than Bertrand competition (Vives, 1985). However, the mechanism
leading to this result diﬀers from that used in standard industrial organization models where the marginal util-
ity of income is constant and the same under the two competition regimes, while Bertrand ﬁrms supply more
output than Cournot ﬁrms. In contrast, the marginal utility of income is variable here. Since the consumption
and output of each variety is the same under both regimes while the residual demand curve is steeper under
Bertrand than under Cournot, ﬁrms charge $$lower prices and earn smaller proﬁts in the former case than in
the latter, which implies yC > yB.$$ By (4), the marginal utility of income is thus lower under Cournot, making
competition softer under this regime. Second, when f/L→ 0, which may be interpreted as f → 0 or L→∞,
8
the number n of competitors can become arbitrarily large. In this event, both types of oligopolistic competition
deliver similar market outcomes, as the two markups are approximately equal to ru(0). Whether the limit of
Cournot and Bertrand competition is perfectly competitive or monopolistic competitive thus depends on the
value of ru(0) ≥ 0, $$which is ﬁnite as implied by (13).$$
When ru(0) = 0, an inﬁnitely large number of ﬁrms always leads to the perfectly competitive outcome, as
maintained by Robinson (1934) and Kaldor (1935). The intuition is easy to grasp. When the love for variety
vanishes at 0, consumers no longer value product diﬀerentiation and treat varieties as perfect substitutes. In
this case, it is hardly a shock that perfect competition prevails. On the contrary, when ru(0) > 0, a very
large number of ﬁrms whose size is small relative to the market size is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms
retain enough market power for their markup to be bounded away from zero. Intuitively, the love for variety
is now strong enough to overcome the decrease in consumption. Since consumers still perceive varieties as
being diﬀerentiated, ﬁrms retain some monopoly power, and thus price above marginal cost. This agrees with
Chamberlin (1933). In short, the nature of the limit of oligopolistic competition depends on preferences.
To illustrate, consider the HARA utility
u(x) = (a+ x)ρ − aρ,
where a is a non-negative constant while 0 < ρ < 1. We have
ru(x) = (1− ρ)
x
a+ x
∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, as long as a > 0, monopolistic competition is not the limit of a large group of ﬁrms. In contrast,
when a = 0, we have ru(0) = 1−ρ > 0. Therefore, the CES model of monopolistic competition is the limit of a
large group of ﬁrms, but the other HARA models of monopolistic competition, as well as CARA and quadratic,
are not. Another example of preferences that lead to a monopolistically competitive limit is obtained when the
subutility is given by **the convex combination of two** CES functions:
u(x) = θxρ1 + (1− θ)xρ2 ,
where $$0 < θ < 1 and$$ 0 < ρ1 ≤ ρ2 < 1. When ρ1 = ρ2, we fall back on the CES case. Otherwise, the
elasticity of substitution is variable while the RLV is
ru(x) =
θρ1(1− ρ1) + (1− θ)ρ2(1− ρ2)xρ2−ρ1
θρ1 + (1− θ)ρ2xρ2−ρ1
,
and thus ru(0) = 1− ρ1 > 0.
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4 Free entry
4.1 Oligopolistic competition
In this section, we assume that ﬁxed costs act as an entry barrier (f > 0). In equilibrium, proﬁts must be
non-negative for ﬁrms to operate. The budget constraint can be rewritten as follows:
y = 1− nf
L
+
1
L
n
j=1
pj − c
pj
pjqj,
which, after symmetrization, yields
y = 1− nf
L
+
1
L
m · np · q = 1− nf
L
+m · y ⇐⇒ y = 1− nf/L
1−m .
Ignoring the integer problem, proﬁts are zero or, equivalently, y = 1 if and only if the equilibrium number of
ﬁrms under free entry is
nkF =
L
f
mkF <
L
f
, (19)
for k = C,B, while the subscript F stands for free entry. Therefore, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms increases
with the market size and the degree of ﬁrms’ market power, which is measured by the Lerner index, and
decreases with the level of ﬁxed cost. Note also that
x¯kF =
f(1−mkF )
cLmkF
> 0, (20)
provided that mkF satisﬁes 0 < m
k
F < 1. This implies that the equilibrium markups under free-entry must solve
the following equations:
mCF =
f
LmCF
+

1− f
LmCF

ru

f
cLmCF
(1−mCF )

, (21)
mBF =
f
L
+

1− f
L

ru

f
cLmBF
(1−mBF )

. (22)
Under the CES, the right-hand side (22) is a constant K while the right-hand side of (21) is a decreasing
function of mCF , which exceeds K over [0, 1]. Therefore, it must be that m
B
F < m
C
F . It then follows from (19)
and (20) that nCF > n
B
F and q
C
F < q
B
F . The next proposition is our main result. First, we determine suﬃcient
conditions on preferences and market size for a free-entry equilibrium to exist and to be unique. Second, we
show that the above inequalities hold for any utility u.
Proposition 2. Assume that (13) and (14) hold. If f > 0, then there is a value L0 > 0 such that, for every
L ≥ L0, there exists a unique symmetric free-entry Cournot equilibrium and a unique symmetric free-entry
Bertrand equilibrium. The equilibrium markups, outputs and numbers of ﬁrms satisfy
mCF > m
B
F q
C
F < q
B
F n
C
F > n
B
F
10
and
lim
L→∞
mCF (L) = lim
L→∞
mBF (L) = ru(0).
Proof. We show that under each competition regime the ﬁrst-order condition has a unique solution, while
we prove in Appendix A that ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are strictly quasi-concave. Therefore, the solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(i) Existence. Setting ϕ ≡ f/L, we have the following functions:
FC(m,ϕ) ≡ ϕ
m
+

1− ϕ
m

ru

ϕ(1−m)
cm

−m,
FB(m,ϕ) ≡ ϕ+ (1− ϕ) ru

ϕ(1−m)
cm

−m,
which are deﬁned for all ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and m ∈ (0, 1). Using (21), (22) and (27), the equilibrium markup mk solves
the equations F k(m,ϕ) = 0 for k = C,B.
Note that F k(1, ϕ) < 0 for all admissible values of ϕ and k = C,B. Since ru(1/2c) > 0, ϕ¯ ∈ (0, 1/2) exists
such that
G(ϕ) ≡ ru

1− 2ϕ
2c

− 2ϕ > 0
holds for all ϕ ∈ (0, ϕ¯). Then, FC(2ϕ, ϕ) > FB(2ϕ, ϕ) > G(ϕ) > 0 implies that for any ϕ ∈ (0, ϕ¯) and
k = C,B, the equation F k(m,ϕ) = 0 has at least one solution mk(ϕ) ∈ (2ϕ, 1). Thus, an equilibrium markup
mk(ϕ) exists if ϕ is suﬃciently small (ϕ < ϕ¯).
(ii) Uniqueness. This is done by showing that the derivative of F k(m,ϕ) with respect to m is always
negative at any solution to F k(m,ϕ) = 0.
Note that the equilibrium individual consumption is such that
xk(ϕ) =
ϕ
cmk(ϕ)
(1−mk(ϕ)).
Therefore, we have
∂FC
∂m
(mC(ϕ), ϕ) = −

ϕ
(mC)2
	
1− ru
	
xC



+

1− ϕ
mC
 r′u 	xC
xC
mC(1−mC) + 1

. (23)
Diﬀerentiating ru(x) and rearranging terms yields
r′u(x)x = (1 + ru(x)− ru′(x))ru(x)
for all x > 0. Substituting FC(mC , ϕ ) = 0 and this expression into this (23), we obtain
∂FC
∂m
(mC , ϕ) = − 1
mC

2
ϕ
mC
	
1− ru
	
xC



+
ru
	
xC

 	
2− ru′
	
xC



1− ru (xC)

< 0.
Repeating the same arguments mutatis mutandis for Bertrand competition, we get
∂FB
∂m
(mB, ϕ) = − 1
mB

ru
	
xB

 	
2− ru′
	
xB



1− ru (xB)
+ ϕ
	
1− ru
	
xB



< 0.
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To sum up, when (13) and (14) hold, for all L ≥ L0 ≡ f/ϕ¯ > 0 there exists a unique symmetric free-entry
equilibrium under Cournot and Bertrand given by (mk(L), nk(L)) for k = C,B.
(iii) Ranking. Note that for any given m and ϕ values of functions are ranked as follows:
FC(m,ϕ) > FB(m,ϕ),
which, together with
∂F k
∂m
(mk, ϕ) < 0,
implies that for any given ϕ the symmetric free-entry equilibrium markups are ranked as follows:
mCF (ϕ) > m
B
F (ϕ).
Since
qkF =
f(1−mkF )
cmkF
and nkF =
L
f
mkF ,
we obtain the ranking for outputs and numbers of ﬁrms.
(iv) Limit markups. We show that
lim
ϕ→0
mC(ϕ) = lim
ϕ→0
mB(ϕ) = ru(0)
hold. Observe, ﬁrst, that
lim
ϕ→0
ϕ
mC(ϕ)
= lim
ϕ→0
ϕ
mB(ϕ)
= 0, (24)
so that
lim
L→∞
nCF (L) = lim
L→∞
nBF (L) =∞ (25)
because ϕ ≡ f/L and nk = mkL/f .
To show (24), we consider an arbitrary sequence ϕn → 0. Since mk(ϕ) > 2ϕ, the sequence ϕn/mk(ϕn)
belongs to the compact set [0, 1/2]. Therefore, there exists a subsequence nj → ∞ such that ϕnj/mk(ϕnj ) is
convergent. Let δ be the limit of this subsequence. If δ > 0, it must be that mk(ϕnj )→ 0. Since
mC(ϕnj ) =
ϕnj
mC(ϕnj )
+

1− ϕnj
mC(ϕnj )

ru

ϕnj
mC(ϕnj )
(1−mC(ϕnj ))

,
mB(ϕnj ) = ϕnj + (1− ϕnj)ru

ϕnj
mB(ϕnj )
(1−mB(ϕnj ))

,
taking the limit implies, correspondingly, that δ + (1 − δ)ru(δ) = 0 and/or ru(δ) = 0. This contradicts the
inequality ru(x) > 0 for all x > 0. As a consequence, it must be that δ = 0, which implies (24) due to
arbitrariness of sequence ϕn.
Given that F k(mk(ϕ), ϕ) = 0, taking the limit of F k(mk(ϕ), ϕ) for ϕ→ 0 shows that the limits of mC(ϕ)
and mB(ϕ) are equal to ru(0). Q.E.D.
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Thus, regardless of the type of competition, the limit outcome is determined by the very same condition on
ru(0), no matter how market size is measured, that is, an exogenously high number of ﬁrms or a large population
of consumers. Indeed, as shown by (25), the number of ﬁrms grows unboundedly with L/f . Proposition 2
also highlights the existence of a trade-oﬀ between per variety consumption and product diversity. To be
precise, when free entry prevails, Cournot competition leads to a larger number of varieties, but to a lower
consumption level per variety, than Bertrand competition. Therefore, the comparison between V C = nCF ·u(xCF )
and V B = nBF · u(xBF ) is a priori ambiguous. $$We return to this question in subsection 4.4.$$In the CES case
(u(x) = xρ), the argument goes as follows. Note that the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and the per variety
consumption may be expressed as functions of the markup:
nkF =
L
f
mkF x
k
F =
1
cnkF
− f
cL
=
f
cL
· 1−m
k
F
mkF
,
which implies
V C < V B ⇐⇒ (mCF )1−ρ(1−mCF )ρ < (mBF )1−ρ(1−mBF )ρ.
Since m1−ρ(1 −m)ρ increases for all 0 < m < 1 − ρ and decreases for all 1 − ρ < m < 1, while mCF > mBF
by Proposition 2, it is suﬃcient to show that mBF > 1 − ρ. Using ru(x) = 1 − ρ and (22), we obtain mBF =
1 − ρ + ρf/L > 1 − ρ. As a consequence, Bertrand is more eﬃcient than Cournot (V C < V B), as in Vives
(1985). However, this result need not hold for other utility functions. To show it, assume that u(x) =
√
x+2x
and set f = 1, c = 0.1 and L = 100. Then, using Wolfram Mathematica, we get nCF = 18.3367 > n
B
F = 12.3127
and xC = 0.4454 < xB = 0.7122, and thus V C = 28.5696 > V B = 27.9282, which runs against the conventional
wisdom that holds that Bertrand is more eﬃcient than Cournot.
4.2 Monopolistic competition
Whereas the set of ﬁrms is ﬁnite in oligopolistic competition, in monopolistic competition the set of ﬁrms/varieties
is given by a continuum of mass M , which is endogenous and pinned down by zero-proﬁt condition (we assume
that f > 0). The utility function (1) is replaced by the functional
U(X) =
 M
0
u(xi)di
where X is a consumption proﬁle deﬁned on [0,M ], while the budget constraint is M
0
pixidi = y.
The inverse demand for variety i is then given by
pi(xi, λ) =
u′(xi)
λ
,
so that ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are deﬁned as follows:
πMCi (qi, λ) =

u′(qi/L)
λ
− c

qi − f. (26)
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Each ﬁrm being negligible to the market, it accurately treats the Lagrange multiplier λ as a parameter
in (26). However, ﬁrms are aware that λ is endogenous. As a consequence, to determine whether it enters
the market a ﬁrm must guess what the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier is. Observe the diﬀerence
between (7) and (26): the former depends on the output vector q, whereas the latter depends on qi and λ. The
Lagrange multiplier has the nature of a market statistic that binds together the markets of all varieties, very
much as the budget constraint (2) does under Cournot and Bertrand.
Since u′(x) is strictly decreasing, the demand function for variety i is given by
xi(pi, λ) = ξ(λpi),
where ξ is the inverse function of u′. Thus,
πMCi (pi, λ) = (pi − c)Lξ(λpi)− f.
Because each ﬁrm treats λ as a given, it behaves like a monopolist facing its own demand and, therefore,
choosing price or quantity as a strategy yields the same market outcome. For a given the mass M of ﬁrms,
an equilibrium is a function q¯i deﬁned over [0,M ] such that (almost) no ﬁrm i ∈ [0,M ] ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
deviate unilaterally from q¯i while anticipating accurately the equilibrium value of λ.
Amonopolistic competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the conditions (E.1)-(E.4) plus the zero-proﬁt condition:
ΠMCi (pi, λ) = 0 for (almost) all i. Since ﬁrms face the same Lagrange multiplier, the solution to the proﬁt-
maximizing condition is the same across ﬁrms, i.e. qi = qˆ for (almost) all i ∈ [0,M ]. In other words, if a
monopolistic competitive equilibrium exists, it must be symmetric. As for the equilibrium value of λ, it is given
by
λˆ =M
qˆ
L
u′

qˆ
L

,
which implies that qˆ depends on M . A MC-equilibrium may thus be deﬁned by a pair (q∗,M∗) such that
(almost) every ﬁrm i ∈ [0,M∗] maximizes its proﬁts at qi = q∗, while the mass M∗ of ﬁrms is such that these
ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts: πMC(q∗,M∗) = 0.
The equilibriummarkup under monopolistic competition is the solution to the implicit equation (Zhelobodko
et al., 2012):
mMC = ru

f
cLmMC
(1−mMC)

, (27)
which tends to ru(0) when L/f becomes arbitrarily large, as do the markups under Cournot and Bertrand.
In this case, the markup mMC is positive if and only if ru(0) > 0, and thus operating proﬁts are positive as
predicted by Proposition 2.
4.3 Comparing Cournot, Bertrand and Chamberlin
Comparing directly Cournot and Bertrand with Chamberlin is a hard task because oligopolistic competition
involves a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, whereas monopolistic competition relies on a continuum of ﬁrms. Rigorous
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techniques have been developed to study when the former models “converge” toward the latter, but such an
analysis cannot be developed within the format of this paper (Hildenbrand, 1974). Therefore, in what follows,
we propose two heuristic, but intuitive, approaches that both lead to similar results.
In the ﬁrst one, the number of ﬁrms is ﬁnite regardless of the competition regime. In this case, what
distinguishes monopolistic competition from oligopolistic competition is that each ﬁrm treats the marginal
utility of income as a parameter in the former, whereas a ﬁrm manipulates this magnitude in the latter. To
make the comparison possible with a ﬁnite number n of ﬁrms, we assume here that each ﬁrm behaves as if
it were a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm, that is, ∂λ/∂xi = 0 or ∂λ/∂pi = 0. Under these circumstances,
the above analysis holds true provided that M is replaced with n. Since ru(x) < 1, comparing (22) and (27)
shows that mBF is larger than m
MC
F . Furthermore, taking the limit of (21)-(22) and (27), using arguments
similar to those developed in part (iv) of the proof of Proposition 2, and summarizing, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that symmetric free-entry Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competitive equi-
libria exist. Then, the corresponding markups are such that
mCF > m
B
F > m
MC
F . (28)
Furthermore, limmCF (L/f) = limm
B
F (L/f) = limm
MC(L/f) = ru(0) when L/f →∞.
Hence, monopolistic competition is tougher than Cournot and Bertrand competition, where the former is
less aggressive than the latter. Furthermore, for a given market size, monopolistic competition is a better
approximation of Bertrand than of Cournot.
In the second approach, we assume that an oligopolistic ﬁrm is a cartel formed by a mass of negligible ﬁrms,
which produce each a single ﬁrm-speciﬁc variety and act at the unison by choosing the output or price that
maximizes joint proﬁts. For Proposition 2 to be applied to such cartels, each one must involves a unit mass of
negligible ﬁrms associated with the interval [i− 1, i]. In other words, the n cartels provide a total mass n of
varieties. In this context, consumers’ preferences must be reformulated as follows:
U(X) =
n
i=1
 i
i−1
u(xij)dj,
so that varieties produced by ﬁrms belonging to the same cartel, or to diﬀerent cartels, enter preferences
symmetrically. By the mean-value theorem, k ∈ [i− 1, i] exists such that
xi = xik u(xi) =
 i
i−1
u(xij)dj,
and thus u(xi) = u(xij) for all j ∈ [i− 1, i] at any outcome symmetric over [i− 1, i]. The proﬁts earned by a
cartel are then given by (8) under Cournot and by (10) under Bertrand. Since the cartels behave strategically,
the free entry equilibrium is described by Proposition 2.
Using (19) and (28) yields nCF > n
B
F > M
∗. Since each cartel supplies a unit mass of varieties, the range
of available varieties provided by the market is the widest under monopolistic competition and the narrowest
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under Cournot competition. This is consistent with the above markup ranking: a soft (tough) competition
regime leads to more (fewer) varieties under free entry.
5 Concluding remarks
Additive preferences are widely used in theoretical and empirical applications of monopolistic competition.
This is why we have chosen to compare the market outcomes under three diﬀerent competitive regimes when
consumers are endowed with such preferences. It is our belief, however, that most of our results hold true in
the case of well-behaved symmetric preferences. Unlike most models of industrial organization which assume
the existence of an outside good, we have used a limited labor constraint. This has allowed us to highlight the
role of the marginal utility of income in ﬁrms’ behavior. Another distinctive feature of our approach is that
ﬁrms recognize that consumers’ incomes are endogenous through the distribution of proﬁts. The assumption
of income-taking ﬁrms seems to be a reasonable alternative to the polar cases in which incomes are taken as
exogenous, as in partial equilibrium analyses, or incomes are strategically manipulated by ﬁrms, which leads
to intractable general equilibrium models. In brief, even though our setup is restrictive, it is suﬃcient to show
that whether monopolistic competition can be the limit of oligopolistic competition depends on the nature of
preferences.
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Appendix
A. Second-order conditions under Cournot
Diﬀerentiating (8) twice and evaluating this expression at symmetric solution qi = q¯, we obtain
∂2ΠCi
∂q2i

qi=q¯
= −(n− 1)y
C
n2 (q¯)2

ru(q¯)(2− ru′(q¯)) +
2
n
(1− ru(q¯))2

< 0.
B. Second-order conditions under Bertrand
It is readily veriﬁed that the following two identities hold:
ru(x) = −
ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
ru′(x) =
ξ(λp)ξ′′(λp)
(ξ′(λp))2
. (A.1)
Diﬀerentiating twice (10) with respect to pi yields
∂2ΠBi
∂p2i
= 2ξ′(piλ)

λ+ pi
∂λ
∂pi

+ (pi − c)ξ
′′
(piλ)

λ+ pi
∂λ
∂pi
2
+ (pi − c)ξ′(piλ)

2
∂λ
∂pi
+ pi
∂2λ
∂p2i

. (A.2)
Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to pi, we obtain
ξ(piλ) + piξ
′(piλ)λ+
n
j=1
p2jξ
′(pjλ)
∂λ
∂pi
= 0,
which implies
∂λ
∂pi
= −ξ(piλ) + piξ
′(piλ)λn
j=1 p
2
jξ
′(pjλ)
.
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Substituting this into the right-hand side of (A.2), symmetrizing and using (A.1), we get that second-order
condition for any symmetric outcome:
2ξ′
λ
n
(n− 1 + ru(x¯)) +
p− c
p
pξ
′′ λ2
n2
(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 +
p− c
p
pξ′

−2λ
n
(1− ru(x¯)) + p
∂2λ
∂p2

< 0.
Substituting the ﬁrst-order condition
m =
p− c
p
=
nru(x¯)
n− 1 + ru(x¯)
shows that (A.2) evaluated at any solution to the ﬁrst-order solution is such that
2ξ′λ
n

(n− 1 + ru(x¯))−
nru(x¯)(1− ru(x¯))
n− 1 + ru(x¯)

+ λp
ξ
′′
λ
n
ru(x¯) (n− 1 + ru(x¯)) +
ru(x¯)np
2ξ′ ∂
2λ
∂p2
n− 1 + ru(x¯)
< 0.
Diﬀerentiating (16) twice with respect to pi, symmetrizing and rearranging terms leads to the following
expression:
np2ξ′
∂2λ
∂p2
= −2ξ
′λ
n
(n− 2(1− ru(x¯))− p
ξ
′′
λ2
n2

(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 + (1− ru(x¯))2

,
which allows one to rewrite (A.2) as follows:
2ξ′

(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 − nru(x¯)(1− ru(x¯))− ru(x¯)(n− 2(1− ru(x¯)))

−ru(x¯)λpξ
′′

(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 −
1
n
	
(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 + (1− ru(x¯))2


< 0.
Using (A.1), this inequality is equivalent to
2

A− ru′(x¯)
2
B

ξ′ < 0,
where
A ≡ (n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 − nru(x¯)(1− ru(x¯))− ru(x¯) [n− 2(1− ru(x¯))]
B ≡ (n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 −
1
n

(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 + (1− ru(x¯))2

.
Since ξ′ = 1/u′′ < 0, it is suﬃcient to show that the term between parentheses is positive. Note that (13)
implies
B =
n− 1
n
(n− 1 + ru(x¯))2 −
1
n
(1− ru(x¯))2 > 0
for all n ≥ 2. It then follows from (14) that
A− ru′(x¯)
2
B > A−B = (1− ru(x¯))
2
n

(n− 1)2 + 1

> 0,
which yields the desired inequality. Q.E.D.
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